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NON-FAULT DIVORCE IN OHIO
CLAYTON W. ROSE, JR.*
Since the Civil War and the industrial revolution in the United States
there has been sweeping social change which has made a restructuring of
divorce laws desirable. Prior to the Civil War the social structure of the
United States was primarily made up of a network of many small rural
family units that were basically self-sufficient. The economy of the coun-
try was based on these rural families, and naturally laws were passed to
preserve the existence of these individual family units. These laws were
designed to keep the family unit together and functioning, unless there was
some drastic reason for allowing divorce. So rigid was this system that
there were only four narrow grounds for divorce in Ohio in 1804.1 The
feeling of the courts at this time was exemplified by the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court in Maynard v. Hill:
Other contracts may be modified, restricted or enlarged, or entirely re-
leased upon the consent of the parties. Not so with marriage. The rela-
tion once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to various obliga-
gations and liabilities. It is an instiution in the maintenance of which in
its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the
family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization
nor progress.2
I. SOCIETAL CHANGE
Since the middle of the last century change in our country's social cli-
mate has decreased the need for such rigid protection of the family. The
cultural outlook of the United States is no longer predominantly rural;
its economy is based on a massive industrial complex. The general
movement of people to urban communities has provided new opportuni-
ties to the individual members of a family thereby making their participa-
tion in the unit less vital for their welfare. Modern schools and govern-
mental aid have produced a more affluent and intellectually stimulating
climate resulting in increased opportunities to children outside the family
unit. There is also an increased mobility in life which makes existence
more impersonal. Modern transportation has made it possible for the
members of an individual family unit to be separated by many hundreds
and even thousands of miles; the mother visiting friends, the father en-
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gaging in business and the children attending school. This type of fam-
ily unit is certainly in less need of protection than the stalwart farm family
of the pre-Civil War era. Not only has the family unit decreased in im-
portance in our economy, but it has become cumbersome and inefficient.
This age of specialization and the increase in trade facilities has bypassed
the individual rural family trying to completely provide for its own needs.
The status of women has also increased in society so that they need not
have the absolute protection of an indissoluble marriage. This trend
started in Ohio as far back as 1887 with the passage of the Married Wo-
man's Act. This act "practically emancipated a woman from the control
of her husband." 3  Since 1887 a married woman has had the right to
separately own property, enter into business, acquire earnings and profits
and participate in legal matters free from any right of control by her hus-
band. This has led to independence for a married woman and an eco-
nomic emancipation from the support provided by her spouse. The trend
was further emphasized by the woman's suffrage movement culminating
in 1920 in the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
giving women equal voting rights with men. The extent to which this
legal and economic emancipation has grown is reflected in the equal op-
portunity employment laws that have been recently passed to give women
equal footing with men in seeking and holding jobs.4
Liberal social and professional standards have also made women more
independent. At one time women were theoretically and practically bar-
red from participation in the professions, but these bars have been dropped
as is evidenced by the increasing number of women entering the profes-
sions. So strong is this trend that the law profession, traditionally re-
served for the "stronger" sex, is almost completely open to women. Prac-
tically every law school in the country admits women students. 5
Along with the increased status of women in society and the decline in
importance, both economically and sociologically, of the family unit has
come a greatly liberalized view of divorce in the United States. There has
been a transition from an indissoluble marriage to a terminable form.
Public opinion has changed from a sharp to mild disapproval of divorce.
Not only does society realize that "bad" marriages lead only to greater
problems if forced to continue, but the increased independence and mobil-
ity of our society often removes the divorce from public view and releases
persons from the force of public opinion.
In education, there has been a shift to increased emphasis on pre-mar-
ital education reflecting the philosophy of solving problems before they
occur, rather than trying to hold a marriage together after it has become
3 Dillingham v. Dillingham, 9 Ohio App. 248 (1917).
4See OHio RmvIsED CODE ANN. § 4111.17 (Page 1954).
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plagued with problems. Testimony at the hearings leading to the reform
of the California domestic relations laws reflect this emphasis:
My main recommendation to this committee would be that California
launch upon an aggressive program of education for marriage and parent-
hood in the schools. The evidence shows that California cannot afford
to neglect this kind of basic education.
Adequate courses in family living create in students some caution about
marrying hastily. Young people who get a realistic understanding of what
marriage means realize that it is not a quick and easy escape from problems
in life. The well prepared young person will be more inclined to take a
longer look before he goes into a youthful marriage.
Adequate preparation for marriage also should improve the student's
chances for success when he does marry. If he gains some conception of
the responsibilities and obligations that marriage involves he should be-
come better able to assess and improve his ability to meet the requirements
for building a good marriage.6
Reflecting the liberalized public sentiment toward divorce is the
change in laws governing it. There has been an increase in the number of
grounds for divorce as legislators have tried to keep pace with change.
Ohio, for example, now has ten grounds for divorce in a system that is de-
rived from a constitution that originally had no provision for divorce or
alimony.7 There has been an increasing liberalization of judicial inter-
pretation of the various grounds. In 1953 Julius M. Kovachy, a judge of
the 8th District Court of Appeals of Ohio, and a former Cuyahoga County
Common Pleas judge, listed no less than twenty-one reasons for granting
divorces ranging from "repeated physical attack" to "in-law interference"
and "hobby first."" In addition to this judicial liberalization of the
grounds for divorce, there is a definite mellowing in judicial opinion as a
whole toward the problem of divorce. This mellowing is shown in a
case decided by the Supreme Court of California. The court stated that
"public policy does not discourage divorce where the relations between
husband and wife are such that the legitimate objects of matrimony have
been utterly destroyed."9 This is a far cry from the philosophy expressed
by the United States Supreme Court in Maynard v. Hill.
The traditionally conservative view of the various religious organiza-
tions toward divorce has undergone change. Recently, when Canada was
in the midst of a drive to modernize and liberalize its divorce laws, the
traditionally conservative Catholic Church showed signs of relenting on
6 Hearings on Domestic Relations Before the Assembly Interim Committee on ludiciary,
California Assembly at 40-41 (1964). [hereinafter cited as 1964 Hearings).
7 Dillingham v. Dillingham, 9 Ohio App. 248 (1917).
8 Kovachy, supra note 1, at 64.
9 Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d 82, 93, 142 P.2d 417, 422 (1943).
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the matter. The Canadian Catholic Conference, the national organization
of the Catholic Bishops of Canada, stated:
Since other citizens, desiring as we do the promotion of the common good,
believe that it is less injurious to the individual and to society that divorce
be permitted in certain circumstances, we would not object to some revi-
sion of the Canadian divorce laws that is truly directed to advancing the
common good of civil society.1o
The marital breakdown concept which is the heart of most, if not all,
of the recent legislation was recently approved by a group appointed by
the Archbishop of Canterbury and headed by Bishop Mortimer."
II. DEFICIENCIES OF OHIO'S PRESENT LAWS
Presently Ohio has a traditional system of divorce laws that is basically
similar to that of the majority of the states. This system is composed of
ten grounds for divorce with their individual defenses and the equity based
defense of recrimination. The ten grounds for divorce in Ohio are: (A)
Either party had a husband or wife living at the time of the marriage from
which the divorce is sought; (B) Willful absence of the adverse party for
one year; (C) Adultery; (D) Impotency; (E) Extreme cruelty; (F) Fraudu-
lent contract; (G) Any gross neglect of duty; (H) Habitual drunkenness;
(I) Imprisonment of the adverse party in a state or federal penal institution
under sentence thereto at the time of filing the petition; (J) Procurement
of a divorce without this state, by a husband or wife, by virtue of which
the party who procured it is released from the obligations of the marriage,
while such obligations remain binding upon the other party.,' These
grounds have been interpreted by Ohio courts so that a divorce can not
be granted on the mere ground of expedience,' 3 nor merely on account of
the fact that the parties are not able to live together happily.'4 Thus it
can be seen that the Ohio interpretation of its divorce laws does not include
any specific concept of marital breakdown such as has been included in
the recent changes in New York and California. In fact, Ohio courts in
their interpretation of the Ohio Revised Code provisions on divorce ad-
here mainly to the view presented by Justice Hitchcock in Harter v. Ha-
ter in 1832:
Perhaps there is no statute in Ohio more abused than the statute con-
ceming 'divorce and alimony.' Perhaps there is no statute under which
greater imposition is practised upon the court and more injustice done to
individuals .... I would not be understood that there are no meritorious
10 CANADIAN CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, REPORT ON DIvORCE REFORM, (1966).
1 1 PurrNG ASUNDER: A DIVORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (London, 1966).
12 OHIo RvisED CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Page 1954).
13 Seibert v. Seibert, 32 Ohio App. 487, 168 N.E. 223 (1929).
14 Burke v. Burke, 36 Ohio App. 551, 173 N.E. 637 (1930).
1970]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
cases. That there are some such there can be no doubt. But of the great
multitude of cases which are before this court I am confident that by far
the greater number are not of this class. Aware of these circumstances,
and aware, too, of the immoral and mischievous tendency of an easy dis-
solution of this most solemn of all contracts, we have ever been disposed
to give a strict construction to the law, and not to hear a case unless the
applicant brings himself or herself within both the letter and spirit of the
statute.15
One can easily see that this strict construction of the laws in an area so af-
fected by social change can only have a stifling effect on our legal system.
Society has undergone tremendous and sweeping changes since the Civil
War, but still Ohio is trying to function with a system of laws that was
established 150 years ago.
In addition to the basic inflexibility built into the system by the rigid
"grounds" classification, there are several specific aspects of the system
which lead to inequities. One of the most glaring examples is the defense
of recrimination. Basically this is a check built into the system whereby a
person can not bring divorce proceedings against his spouse unless he ap-
proaches the court with "dean hands." Psychiatrists and sociologists tell
us time and again that seldom is there an innocent party in a divorce, so
an equitable "dean hands" defense can seldom, if ever, be rationally ap-
plied. A vivid example showing the fallacy of the recrimination defense
is provided by Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of
California at Davis:
Husband and wife do not get along. They have incessant fights, in-
variably ending with kitchen utensils and other objects being thrown in
both directions. The husband brings a divorce action on the ground of
cruelty. The wife answers charging the husband with cruelty towards her.
The divorce is denied on the basis of the ancient doctrine of recrimina-
tion which does not permit a plaintiff who is himself guilty of a marital
offense to obtain a divorce.16
Obviously the couple in the preceding situation were not succeeding in
marriage; they posed as a threat to each other, both physically and mentally.
What use is there in preserving a marriage where the partners incessantly
fight? What rights of either party were protected by the defense of re-
crimination? In this example as in many other cases the defense of re-
crimination serves no useful purpose. Even more damaging than this lack
of beneficial attributes is that recrimination is often used as a coercive tool
by a vindictive spouse to hold together a marriage that has irreparably
broken down. This serves only to breed more family problems for the
partners and lead to sad effects on the children.
Another part of the Ohio system of divorce laws that reduces its effi-
35 Harter v. Harter, 5 Ohio St. 319 (1832).
16 Bodenheimer, Reflections on the Future of Grounds for Divorce, 8 J. FAM. L 179 (1968).
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cacy is the requirement of corroboration. Under this rule as set out in
Section 3105.11 ". . a judgment for divorce or alimony shall not be
granted upon the testimony or admissions of a party unsupported by other
evidence." Since marital disputes are generally private situations, the cor-
roboration must come almost exclusively from other members of the im-
mediate family. Therefore, the other members of the family are called as
witnesses and put under a psychological strain at even the mere possibility
of having to testify against one party or the other. Having to give corrob-
orating testimony can even cause disputes in the witness's own family if
other members view the circumstances differently than the witness him-
self. It seemingly would be better to replace this device with a reinforced
law governing perjury in divorce cases. This would both advance the ob-
jective of gaining true evidence and relieve the stress placed on other
members of the family that would otherwise be called as corroborating
witnesses. Besides this, it would expedite the divorce hearings by omit-
ting much testimony, thus making them less expensive for both the parties
and the state.17
There are also other drawbacks that accompany a system of divorce
like Ohio's. Since the divorce process is an adversary process it is quite
amenable to negotiations either to gain an uncontested divorce or to stop
defending in a divorce action. This completely goes against the objec-
tives of the laws because the negotiation omits any reference to the guilty
party, but it is practical because it is often faster and less expensive than
trying to litigate a contested divorce. Also the threat of alimony, custody
and support are used as coercive tools in pretrial negotiations between the
parties to gain an advantage in the adversary system. When the system is
comprised of one person being pitted against another in an adversary
process with only one "winner" all of these factors play an important
part.
Dr. Jerry P. Nims, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Marriage Coun-
seling, California State Psychological Association summarizes the prob-
lem:
It is a serious matter to break up a home and it should be done only after
consultation and very serious and thoughtful deliberation, after a good deal
of searching examination. But there is no point to the adversary approach.
The quibbling or the inventing of legal grounds is a kind of fictional in-
ventive process which really is a test of imagination and not an assessment
of the situation. My own experience also reveals that invariably there is a
far greater amount of anger between the parties at the end of the legal
17 The following are the usual questions asked of a witness as corroboration in an uncon-
tested divorce: Have you heard the testimony of the plaintiff?
Do you know these statements to be true?
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proceedings than there was actually at the time they made the decision to
divorce.18
Aside from these major shortcomings in Ohio's divorce system, there
are other faults that should be explored. First, in Ohio at the present
time, the courts have no jurisdiction to make custody orders where a di-
vorce action has been dismissed.1 This leaves the young children as
pawns to be shuffled about by the parents and also leads to "bribing" of
older children as to which separated parent to choose. During the im-
pressionable years of childhood this unsteady climate is certainly a dis-
advantage to the child. It has been noted that a child from divorced or
separated parents is more likely to become divorced himself"° and this
poor family atmosphere may well be a part of this problem. Even after
the child is older, he is by no means free from the stresses caused by a
separation. Although the older child is ordinarily free to elect with which
parent he wishes to live, he certainly does not make his decision in a vacuum.
Both parents naturally want custody of the child and often promise many
gifts and privileges if the child elects to live with that parent. This
"bribing" can become very competitive and place the child in a tense, try-
ing situation. Not only does this "bribing" put undue pressure on the
child, but it also leads to friction between the parents that may suffocate
any hope of conciliation that remains. The Court should be given jur-
isdiction to order supervision of the family after granting a decree of
separation. If this is not done, the separation serves no useful purpose.
The family is torn apart by the competition between the parents; the sep-
aration period, which hopefully will give people time to solve their prob-
lems, only serves to kindle new ones. If the objective of our divorce laws
is to preserve the family, then the separation period must be accompanied
by counseling and supervision of the family we are to preserve so that
inner tensions do not cause it to break apart.
The residence requirement set out in Section 3105.03 is also entirely too
long. A person who has established a bonafide residence in Ohio should
be accorded the rights of an Ohio citizen. This includes allowing them
to avail themselves of Ohio courts in handling their marital dispute. The
parties should not be made to suffer through an entire year in the tension
ridden environment accompanying an impending divorce. The one-year
time period is wasteful and serves no useful purpose. Forcing the parties
to live together can lead to little good, and actually may have harmful
effects. There is no reason why a new citizen of Ohio cannot be granted
a divorce without having to live here for a period so long as a year. This
181964 Hearings, at 42; see also, Traynor, Law and Socetal Change in a Democratic Society,
U. ILL. L F. 230 (1956).
19 Omo 11REv. CoDE ANN. § 3109.04 (Page 1954). See, Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 21 Ohio
L. Abs. 590 (App., Franklin County, 1936).
201964 Hearings at 37-40.
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long period also puts a tremendous burden on the plaintiffs because time
is money when an attorney is on retainer. The requirement was originally
passed to prevent Ohio from becoming a "divorce mill," but other Ohio
laws now negate this chance. For instance, the venue requirement pro-
vides that a plaintiff must be a bonafide resident of the county where the
action is initiated at least 90 days prior to the action.21 Certainly no per-
son is going to migrate to Ohio for a divorce if he has to establish a bona-
fide residency and stay three months in the county where he desires to file.
III. FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC REFORM
As stated before, divorce reform is not a new concept in the United
States or the rest of the world. In the past few years the divorce laws of
many foreign jurisdictions have undergone massive revisions. Divorce
after proof of marital breakdown is already in operation in Greece, Swit-
zerland, Yugoslavia and Japan. It is the sole basis in the Soviet Union and
most communist countries. Moreover, to go further, mutual consent of
husband and wife is grounds for divorce, with certain safeguards, in Nor-
way, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and Portugal.2"
The concept of marital breakdown is also implicit in some of the
grounds that exist today and have existed for many years in the United
States. Grounds such as insanity, living separate and apart, physical mal-
formation preventing intercourse, feeblemindedness and epilepsy imply a
non-fault breakdown rather than a matrimonial offense.2 Incompatabil-
ity itself as a ground is present in some form in Alaska,
4 New Mexico,2 5
Oklahoma,2 6 and the Virgin Islands.2 7  Twenty-two states, Puerto Rico
and the District of Columbia now provide for divorce on the ground of
living separate and apart without cohabitation for certain periods.2' Con-
2 1 OpO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.03 (Page 1954).
2 2 Mace, Marriage Breakdown or Matrimonial Offense: A Clinical or Legal Approach to
Divorce? 14 AM. U. L REV. 178 (1965).
2 3 Insanity (29 states), living apart (18 states), disappearance (4 states), mental incapacity
(2 states, Georgia and Pennsylvania) physical malformation preventing intercourse (Kentucky),
incompatability (3 states), feeble-mindedness and epilepsy (Delaware). BOWMAN AND HENRY,
DIVORCE FOR MODERNS 534-35 (4th ed. 1960).
24 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55. 110(5)(c) (1962) "incompatability of temperament.
25 N. M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1 (8) (1953) ["incomparability"].
20 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (7) (1961) ["incompatability"].
27 V. I. CODE, tit 16, § 104 (a) (8) (1964) f"incompatability of temperament"].
2 8ALA. CODE, tit 34, § 22 (1) (1958); Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (West, 1956);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (Bobbs-Merrill, Replacement, 1962); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
46-1-1 (J) (Supp. 1960); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 13, § 1522(11) (1957); D. C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-403 (1961); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-610 (1947); KY. REV. STAT. § 403.020 (1)(b)
(1955); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-301 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16 § 24(5) (1957); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518.06(8) (1958); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125-010 (1957); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 458.7 (Supp. 1957); N. Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney Session Laws 1966); N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950); N. D. CENT. CODE § 14-06-5 (1943); P. R. LAws ANN., tit. 31,
§ 321(9) (1955); R. L GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3 (1956); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT., art. 4629(4)
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sidering that the separation provision is premised on the notion that re-
maining apart for a given time is conclusive evidence of the fact of mar-
riage breakdown, the separation provision is probably the major non-fault
ground for divorce in America.29  Also it should be noted that another
recent reform focusing on eliminating the deterioration of family life
and marriage is the addition of conciliation departments to divorce courts.
They exist in varying degrees in at least fifteen states.30
The Ohio legislature has taken a significant step in divorce reform
already by providing for conciliation procedures in all major Ohio coun-
ties. Newly enacted Ohio Revised Code sections 3117.01 to 3117.08 in-
clusive outline the structure of the conciliation procedure which provides
for a separate branch of the common pleas court to work with a trained
staff to attain settlement of marital disputes. The new law also establishes
a simple form petition procedure whereby the parties can invoke the aid
of the conciliation judge either singly or jointly irrespective of the pend-
ency of any action for divorce, annulment, or alimony. Once the peti-
tion has been filed the conciliation judge may fix a reasonable time and
place for a private hearing, and the judge has the authority to issue cita-
tions to the parties and to witnesses to appear at these hearings. He also
has the authority, with the consent of the parties, to invoke the aid of
physicians, psychologists, clergymen or other persons with expertise in the
matter in controversy. He may also make such orders as he deems neces-
sary to preserve the marriage or implement the reconciliation.
The law also provides that no action for divorce, annulment, or ali-
mony can be commenced or proceed during the time that the conciliation
proceeding is pending; and whenever it appears during divorce, annul-
ment or alimony proceedings that conciliation may prevent dissolution of
the marriage, the case may be transferred to the conciliation judge for
conciliation proceedings.
In the past several years California and New York have made out-
standing contributions to divorce reform in the United States. California's
new law started as Assembly Bill 230 and Senate Bill 86 introduced in the
regular session of the California Legislature in 1968. Recently the bill
was passed by both houses and placed on Governor Reagan's desk to be
signed into law. The bill basically provides California with a family
court and an accompanying professional staff. This act
authorizes the court to make order dissolving the marriage effective when
made when it finds that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been
destroyed and there is no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be
(1958); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1(8) (Supp. 1963); VT. STAT.ANN., tit. 15, § 551 (1958);
WAS. REv. CODE ANN. § 247.07(6) (Supp. 1965); WYO. STAT.ANN. § 20-47 (1957).29 Kleinfeld and Moss, Divorce Reform Act, 5 HARv. J. LEmis. 563 (1968).




saved or in lieu thereof on request of both parties to order legal separa-
tion.31
The new California law is revolutionary in several aspects. First, it
replaces the necessity of marital fault and the concepts of guilt and inno-
cence with a concept of marital breakdown. Secondly, it substitutes an
inquisitory process for the traditional adversary process as an adjunct to
the abolition of the concept of marital fault. Thirdly, as stated before,
it includes in its family court system a staff of investigators and counse-
lors with an eye to conciliation of the parties rather than punishment of
the "guilty" spouse.
The mechanics of this new law are as simple as the concept of the law
is revolutionary. The action is commenced with the filing of a petition
known as "a petition of inquiry to dissolve marriage or for legal separa-
tion." This is accompanied by a requirement that the parties have an
initial interview with the professional staff to explore the desirability of
continuing their marriage. The professional counselor then, within 30
days of filing the petition and proof of service of summons, must file a
report with the court stating whether the parties have decided to become
reconciled, continue counseling for a period not to exceed 60 days with a
view toward reconciliation, or continue their application for inquiry into
the marriage with a view toward dissolution. In the last instance there
still must be further consultation, not to exceed 60 days from the date of
filing proof of service, to work out details of the dissolution of the mar-
riage. The act also provides that where the court fails to dissolve the mar-
riage the procedure is continued for 90 days and then if one or both
parties decide the marriage should be terminated, the court shall dissolve
the marriage.
The new California law goes far to overcome many deficiencies in
systems such as that in Ohio. First, as was stated before, the inquisitorial
process is substituted for our traditional adversary system. This in itself
is a major improvement in the domestic relations law. Since there is no
adversary process, the marital partners are no longer pitted as adversaries
and there is no need to dredge up fault on the part of one party or another.
By doing away with the fault-oriented system California can take a real-
istic attitude in recognizing the end of the de facto marriage. Therefore
California under the new law can dissolve a marriage because of the in-
compatability of the partners
[w]hen it appears that the purpose of matrimony had been destroyed to
the extent that further living together was intolerable, it was in accord-
ance with the court's duty and prerogative to grant the plaintiff a divorce.
It is not the policy of the law that a man and wife should be required to
31 A. B. 230, California Legislature, Regular Session (1968).
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live together or be held in a marital relationship when they have come to
regard each other as mere strangers.32
This is the policy that lies behind the use of incompatability as a
basis for dissolving marriage.
Similar in ideal to incompatability is voluntary separation. Both of
these criteria depend on the concept of breakdown of the marriage to an
irreparable extent. Voluntary separation, though, has had in the past the
implication of divorce by mutual consent and has been shunned. Califor-
nia under its new law, however, can recognize a divorce by mutual con-
sent as long as the public policy of dissolving only marriages which have
irreparably broken down is kept in mind. As was stated in the Final Re-
port on Domestic Relations:
The principal distinction between voluntary separation and incompat-
ability lies, however, not so much in the indicia which go to establish the
existence of the cause, but in the implications of voluntary separation.
Granting a divorce upon the latter basis is to recognize divorce by mutual
consent.as
It is unrealistic to fail to recognize that in practice numerous divorces
are carried out under circumstances of mutual consent. One of the factors
which has brought divorce law into disrepute is that it continues to regard
litigation as an adversary proceeding, and, not as it is in many cases, a
mutual arrangement.34  The number of undefended cases is but further
evidence which goes to prove this now well-accepted statement.33
By doing away with the fault-oriented concept of divorce, California
also has eliminated the fault-oriented defenses. Therefore, recrimination
and condonation can no longer be used by a spouse to block a divorce
when the marriage has actually broken down and serves no useful pur-
pose.
As one can readily see, the California proposal is a revolutionary new
plan. It almost completely abolishes "grounds for divorce" per se and
substitutes for these a system of divorce based on irreparable breakdown.
Though this is probably the basic cause of most divorces, up until now it
has never been recognized as a justifiable reason for divorce. The pri-
mary reason for this is that most people felt that by eliminating grounds
32 Ohligschlager v. Ohligschlager, 125 Cal. App. 2d 458, 270 P.2d 577 (1954); see also
Inskeep v. Inskeep, 5 Iowa 204 (1857); Clyburn v. Clyburn, 175 Ark. 330, 299 S.W. 38
(1927); Widstraud v. Widstraud, 87 Minn. 136, 91 N.W. 432 (1902).
33 23 FINAL REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITEE ON JUDICIARY-R33LATING
TO DoMEsTIc RELATIONs, No. 6 at 77 (California Assembly 1969) [hereinafter cited as 23
FINAL REPORT 6].
34 Id. at 77.
35 In the United States answers were filed to about 1/7 of all petitions (14.8 percent
1946-50), but this does not necessarily reflect controversy over the granting of the decree, for




for divorce, it would encourage people to file for divorce. The California
Committee on Domestic Relations, however, dealt with the problem and
after extensive hearings concluded that:
Most sociologists would be hostile to the argument that easy grounds for
divorce would lead to individuals taking marriage lightly, for most people
intend, on entering the relationship, to make the partnership last for life.
Certainly there is no evidence to support the contrary view. 30
In New York, like Ohio, revision of the divorce laws was a slow proc-
ess. The first major revision since 1787 of the substantive law of divorce
in New York was enacted by the legislature and signed by the Governor
on April 27, 1966."7 Most of this new law became effective on September
1, 1967. The main features of the new law include: (1) the expansion of
grounds for divorce including cruelty and two non-fault grounds which
may be invoked when the couple is separated; (2) the limitation of the
historic defenses to just one based on the ground of adultery; (3) the elim-
ination of prohibitions against remarriage by the guilty spouse; (4) the
new conciliation and counseling procedures established by Article 11-3;
(5) a revised section on jurisdiction over matrimonial actions; (6) an
amendment to the General Obligations law which narrowly limits the def-
inition of void and collusive agreements; and (7) new Section 250 of the
Domestic Relations Law which enacts a version of the Uniform Recogni-
tion Act.3"
As can be seen from this summary, New York has gone far toward
liberalizing their divorce laws by including non-fault grounds; and also
has taken the initial steps toward a Family Court system by including the
conciliation and counseling facilities.
The principal innovation of the new law is the creation at state expense
of a Conciliation Bureau in each judicial district under the supervision of
a supreme court justice which will put into effect a three stage procedure
of (1) conciliation conferences, (2) conciliation hearings, and (3) coun-
seling. The new procedure will involve conciliation commissioners and
special guardians chosen from the bar and conciliation counselors chosen
from the counseling profession. 39
The new non-fault grounds also are a revolutionary change in the New
York divorce law. 40 Although they are not as general and inclusive as the
California proposal, the new grounds in New York approach very closely
the concept of divorce because of irreparable breakdown of the marriage.
Two good examples of this are the two grounds based on the living sepa-
36 See, 1964 Hearings; 23 FiNAL REPoRT 6 at 70.
3 7 LAWS 1966, Ch. 254 (McKinney, 1966).
as FOSTR AND FanE, THE DIVORcE REFORM LAw at 6 (1968).
30 Id.
49N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 170 (3), (5) & (6) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
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rate by the parties for a period greater than two years. Section 170 (5)
entitled "Living Separate and Apart Pursuant to Decree of Separation" is
called a "conversion" ground whereby judicial separation is transformed
into absolute divorce. The rationale behind the ground is that living
separate and apart for two years is conclusive evidence of the irreparable
breakdown of the marriage. Some eleven states have enacted various
forms of "conversion" statutes. 41 The ground is completely non-fault as
is evidenced by the fact that the party that was the defendant in the separa-
tion proceeding may file for divorce as long as he has substantially per-
formed the terms accompanying the separation decree. Section 170 (6)
of the New York Domestic Relations Law embodies the same rationale as
Section 170 (5), and closely approaches the voluntary separation ground
in the California proposal. This new ground also goes far to eliminate
the adversary process because of the non-fault basis. The original agree-
ment is jointly filed with no reference to a guilty party or even any guilt,
and then the divorce can be granted either party under Section 170 (6)
as long as he has met the terms of the separation agreement. This non-
fault orientation combined with the counseling and conciliation facilities
make the New York law a great improvement over the traditional system
employed in Ohio.
The legislatures of California and New York have not been the only
ones to recognize and attempt to meet the need for divorce law reform.
The Committee on Divorce of the National Conference of Commissioners
of Uniform States Laws has adopted a preliminary draft of a uniform
code using the "irretrievable breakdown" concept as its principal ingre-
dient, along with several subsections to make the general concept more
specific. In Section 2.5 of the Report to the Committee of the Whole,
the Committee on Divorce recommended a dissolution standard for the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, phrased in the following language:
SECTION 2.5 After consideration of all relevant factors, including the
circumstances which gave rise to the filing of the Petition of Inquiry and
the prospect of reconciliation between the spouses, if the court finds that
the marriage has broken down irretrievably, it shall enter its order dis-
solving the marriage.42
More specific content is then given to this general dissolution standard:
SECTION 2.6 If the court finds that (a) ninety days have elapsed since
the filing of the Petition of Inquiry, and that (b) both parties freely join
in the Petition of Inquiry, it shall conclude that the marriage has broken
down irretrievably and shall enter its order dissolving the marriage. In
these cases the provisions of Section 2.5 shall not apply.
41 See Foster and Freed, Living Apart as Ground for Divorce, N. Y. L.J., May 17, 18 & 19,
1965.
42 REpORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DIVORCE TO THE COMMITTEE OF THE
WHOLE, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (19-).
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SECTION 2.7 If the court finds that the parties have lived separate and
apart for not less than six months immediately preceding the filing of the
Petition of Inquiry, it shall conclude that the marriage has broken down
irretrievably and shall enter its order dissolving the marriage. In these
cases the provisions of Section 2.5 shall not apply 4 3
As can be seen, the standards articulated in the New York Family
Court Act, the California divorce reform and the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Law are quite similar when exposed to the bare bones. All are
founded on the basic concept of "irretrievable breakdown" of the mar-
riage with the superstructure being specifics to delineate the boundaries of
the "irretrievable breakdown." All include the "living separate and apart"
standard, and all go far to avoid the strict adversary process by providing
non-fault grounds for divorce. These proposals also make provision for
professional help in counseling and conciliation.
IV. CONCLUSION
As has been shown, psychologists, sociologists and many members of
the legal profession agree that systems of divorce law like Ohio's adver-
sary approach cannot adequately handle the growing problem of divorce.
To meet the problem proposals similar to the plans of California and
New York have been proffered. These seem to be the most logical ap-
proach to the modern divorce problem. Ohio has already recognized the
need for change and has responded by producing the bill authorizing con-
ciliation judges in domestic relations actions. This bill, however, as signif-
icant as it is, is still only one step in the process of reform. The Ohio Gen-
eral Assembly has recognized that the new law is only a stop-gap measure
and has recently passed a joint resolution "fto appoint a committee from
among the members of the house and senate judiciary committees to make
a comprehensive study of the Ohio laws relating to the field of domestic
relations.""4 It is hoped that the General Assembly's efforts will result in
substitution of a viable, sensitive, non-fault oriented system similar to those
discussed for what the Assembly itself has termed "an archaic adversary
fault sustem which only seldom concentrates on the real problems .... 45
43 Id.
44 House Joint Resolution No. 38, 108th Ohio General Assembly (1969).
45Id.
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